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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
COMMERCIAL UNION ASSOCIATES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN N. CLAYTON, DAVID L. 
CLAYTON, and T. SCOTT LINDLEY, 
jointly dba CLAYTON PLASTIC 
SURGERY SPECIALISTS, 
De fendant s/Countere1aimants 
and Appellants. 
ooOoo 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure confers jurisdiction on this Court to hear this Appeal. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Appeal is from a final Order, Judgment on Verdict in a 
bench trial issued in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Case No. 920335-CA 
Priority No. 
L a k e Countj ,. 'iluli nl III nl (the Honorable James S. Sawaya 
p r e s i d i n g ) entered un \u< lint J. y •'( ^ r v e m b e r , 1991 after a 
fragmented trial consisting of the following d a y s : ix-njwiob* i >l i, 
1 9 9 0 , January ,• •- ' , « >' , "ind Apri I 10-Way I
 1( 1 9 cl 1 , wherein 
findings, conclusions and Judijiiioiil "w. i - r IILJ-PI'TW i against the 
Defendants for a breach of lease in the amount of $ 2 % i , ) t \ i ' I' '>>>. 
Appea 1 Is ais.* 'i.j(a"i, • i . if i he liital Order uf the Third Judicial 
District Court in Salt Lake County, Sl-iii- I />• ,jli the Honorable 
Jam*." . Sawaya presiding) denying the Defendant's Motions tor 
Amending and Othe. Judgment pursuant to a Minute 
Entry dated Novembei .'-*'*. (R \ 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I I in i I the court commit reversible e r r o r b y not 
finding that the proposed IW.IM' V-MS vnri due to the? statute ol 
frauds - * n - * * signed t^jly uy p^,^* . ud condj.Lionel I 
guar a ncipal lessee?? 
2 • r • error Dy not 
finding the proposed lease . ,i, ^ . * * <. uuh express 
cood i 1 in)us precedent w e r e never fulfilled? • -
II, Did I I'H i"m"'»411 I jiif ii il r irn/p i s i I ^  ^ r t x permitting 
Respondent to use the doctrine of pant pertcrmaiv -
2 
the statute of frauds in a suit for money damages? 
4. Did the court commit reversible error by binding 
individuals as principal lessees even though they signed the 
lease merely as "guarantors?" 
5. Did the court commit reversible error by not 
finding that the proposed lease failed due to a manifest lack of 
mutual assent by the parties? 
6. Did the court commit reversible error by not 
finding that the proposed lease failed due to a lack of a meeting 
of the minds by the parties? 
7. Did the court commit reversible error by not 
finding that the proposed contract failed due to practical 
impossibility of performance of the contract? 
8. Did the court commit reversible error by not 
finding that the proposed contract failed due to frustration of 
the purpose of the lease? 
9. Did the court commit reversible error by admitting 
parol evidence relative to various terms of the proposed lease 
agreement, then finding that the lease was unambiguous, and 
finally combining a rejected lease with a proposed lease in order 
to have a single, unified document? 
10. Did the court err in not giving Respondents their 
counterclaim damages? 
11. Dnl llh' niri commit reversible error by failing 
to incorporate undisputed tat . - Fact ai*u 
fail to apply said facts Lo Lhe law? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Tin principal authority for this appeal is case law, vu-i! 
this BL" iet cites .^ rj -1 • f i .1  \i U "-Miii'mt a nil certain .statutory Iri^s, 
The important area of determinative authorJIy inhiii I whether 
i in" -«i! im iif.e n i frauds has been violated in trim erase i .ase 
was never signed by ii 11 • n M e % I ml \h sinned by proposed 
conditional guarantors, who the Respondent i low argues riiv 
.lessee!-. "T"l i* signature block appears as follows (R 24) f II 2h) 
(R 30): 
IN WI rNEs|>j\VlIlJ(L,Ul , lite jKiHit'. Iu:i<;iw.havc executed litis 1 case the day and year' 
first a b o v e written.* "'' • 
CLAYTOH PLASTIC SURGERY SPECIALISTS XQJ^l£ECIAL..JUNIQJhL VI LL-
r^i.-.. V ' J .. ^L^CjSsdC^Ssl-
[J c S O R * 
MMUUL 
+"%*-e«e.i - f ,..€. 4LS.+, f-»--»«-e, J • n *J c u * * - it "In " } * 
i H ^ H r; "(i f i^e—«»i-"- | \ fFi l - %-^^^-i-r^-^O^ ^ M-h ^ ^00024 
The determinative authority for whether the case violates 
the statute of frauds is found in Utah Code Annotated §25-5-3 
and §25-5-4 and the common law of Baugh v. Parley, 112 Utah 1, 
184 P.2d 35 (1947). Additionally, whether unfulfilled conditions 
to a lease/contract render it unenforceable are determined by the 
Utah case of Jones v. Acme Building Products, Inc., 452 P.2d 743, 
746 (Utah 1969) and Welch Transfer and Storage v. Oldham 663 P.2d 
73 (Utah 1983). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This case is here on appeal from the Third District 
Court Judgment finding that the Appellants, Clayton Plastic 
Surgery Associates, dba Clayton Plastic Surgery Specialists, a 
corporation and T. Scott Lindley, M.D., John N. Clayton, M.D. and 
David Clayton, M.D. are liable jointly and severally for a five-
year leasehold in the amount of $242,533.56 with judgment 
interest continuing thereon and for $49,781.50 attorney fees and 
costs. 
2. This suit was instituted by the Respondent, 
Commercial Union Associates, first naming only Clayton Plastic 
Surgery Associates, doing business as Clayton Plastic Surgery 
Specialists, and T. Scott Lindley, John N. Clayton and David 
Clayton as jointly and severally liable as partners for and in 
5 
behd I • t||n|i " ' y »hoy referred to as Clayton Plastic Surgery 
Specialists (CPSS), a partnership i »•• ili-nos It ion of Blaine 
Savage,- authorized manager and spokesman ini Respondent lib I«HI1 
as owner I I I. If n:o complex at issue*, I1 was discovered that 
although Mr. Savage tirst aiit'ijnij I v:*: is «i partnership of Un-" 
three signed guarantors, he Identified a lease presented li hi i 
by Appe± CPSS as a corporation with the evidence 
thereof "whited out" by hit* ul I u:c, thuiel^ sltnui'ijiq I li.it Savage 
1MH?W CPSS was a corporation, A new ie')<il theory then emerged: 
an Amended Compid 1111 N i i i n'ii naming lnhn h Clayton and his 
corporation CPSA dba CPSS an an unsigned !<•.-& fat?*1 « i I. h ln"n In luhii 
:vv**** » avton and T, Sent t hindley as unconditionaJ 
guarantors h ). 
After discovery was taken a no i.r idi '<«' ''nmrm'ncpn 
in Appellants prepared a trial brief outlining their position 
diid legal theory, n i« MJUJ/IUH'I lU'ijuiiN.nl md presented a 
summation i,n writing. Respondent tailed to prr*pdi»j i -It-liver a 
briefr waived its opening argument, and provided a rebuttal 
summation Cuiiseqiir-iil I. y , d m nn| t hi." rourse of t:he fragmented 
trial beginning December, 1990 and ending in NnvumbwL, I1.1 '1 III 
"i" |, "inn final conclusions of law prepared by Kespondt-'nt " s 
counsel were unclear CJL. u Im hufal theories Respondent 
sought to employ. 
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4. At trial evidence was given by Appellants 
representing the following legal theories: 
a. No long-term lease existed since it was not 
signed by a lessee. 
b. No long-term lease existed since the following 
material conditions precedent were not met: 
(1) build out to cost $44.00 per foot and 
$97,000 in total rather than the $320,000.00 cost reflected in 
the final bids; 
(2) move in by Thanksgiving, rather than the 
following April as occurred 
(3) lease to commence with issuance of 
certificate of occupancy or the conducting of business by the 
doctors in the leased space neither of which occurred; 
(4) I-certification was to be approved but 
may never be approvable no matter what the cost as warranted by 
lessor; 
(5) The corporation would sign as the lessee 
after all conditions were met. 
c. A first lease was signed by the principal 
lessee but was rejected and whited-out by Respondent. A second 
lease was signed by guarantors only, conditioned upon lessee 
corporation's signing of the lease after the material conditions 
7 
precedent were fulfilled. 
d. The improvements began in place before the 
bids, occupancy, and certification were approved, due to pressure 
of the Landlord and builders. Part of the space was demolished 
to build the surgical operations and rental payments were made 
before occupancy. 
e. The evidence then shows that the bids came in 
nearly 300% higher than represented and the I-certification and 
timing of move-in became speculative. 
f. A decision had to be made to go forward or 
stop. The Appellants believed due to the cost, timing and 
representations, they had a month-to-month tenancy and gave 
notice of termination. 
g. Respondent tried to coerce the Appellants into 
signing new lease documents by threatening millions of dollars in 
litigation, but Appellants refused. Respondent then filed suit. 
5. Notice of Appeal was filed on the December 11, 
1991. A Summary Disposition was filed by Respondent's counsel 
which was denied on March 30, 1992. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the Judgment in favor of 
Appellants as a matter of law and that the Counterclaim damages 
be provided Appellants as prayed for and proved in the trial. 
Alternatively, a new trial is requested. 
However, Appellants feel that as a matter of law this 
reviewing Court can review the face of the documents and the 
unrebutted and undisputed evidence presented therein to reflect a 
month-to-month tenancy occurring in this leasehold and award 
Appellants reversal and its unrebutted damages for being induced 
into this month-to-month leasehold with negligent 
representations. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The most relevant witness for Respondent's case was 
Mr. Lee Teerlink—acting Lease Agent in the matter— who 
conducted all of the negotiations between Respondent and 
Appellants. Blaine Savage was the second material witness for 
the Respondent; he testified as to his intentions and 
understanding under the Lease Agreement as presented to him 
solely by the Lease Agent Lee Teerlink. The Respondent's other 
witnesses substantially relate to Respondent's claim for money 
9 
damages. 
2. Appellants' material witnesses were (1) the 
doctors—who signed as conditional guarantors, (2) the 
prospective lessee, John L. Clayton as President of CPSA dba 
CPSS, (3) a qualified architectural expert named Fred Green, (4) 
State agent Carl R. Ericksen, (5) Mr. Teerlink, (6) Mr. Savage 
(7) and an expert for damage purposes, Mr. Art Dummer, an 
actuary. 
3. The lease in question dated September 27, 1988 was 
signed on or about October 18, 1988, by the conditional 
guarantors only, to wit: David Clayton, T. Scott Lindley and John 
N. Clayton (R 1298). 
4. Clayton Plastic Surgery Associates was a Utah 
corporation consisting of John L. Clayton as sole shareholder and 
president; his sons John N. Clayton and David Clayton, were 
associates and employees of Clayton Plastic Surgeons. (R 1210-
25). CPSA changed its name in 1987 to reflect its specialty in 
plastic surgery. (R 1652-53) Dr. Lindley, through his 
professional corporation, T. Scott Lindley, M.D.P.C., joined CPSA 
dba CPSS from Logan, Utah, to develop CPSS. Each doctor was 
ultimately to become stockholders therein. (R 1253-1254). Their 
goal was to provide plastic surgery in a free-standing operating 
facility which would qualify them for reimbursements by third 
10 
party insurance carriers including Medicaid/Medicare. 
5. Prior to negotiating the proposed lease in 
question, CPSS and its doctors conducted their practice in a 
facility at Prowswood. That facility did not meet their needs. 
In particular, its surgical facility did not qualify for 
Medicaid/Medicare reimbursement; therefore, the doctors had to go 
to perform their surgeries at a hospital thereby accruing 
facility fees and making it less efficient and more burdensome 
for their patients. (R 1662) (R 1937 line 3). 
6. Dr. Lindley approached Lee Teerlink indicating that 
Appellants wanted a facility that could be billed under 
Medicaid/Medicare. This would require an "I-certification" of 
the facilities. All of the doctors made this perfectly clear to 
Mr. Teerlink. (Teerlink at R 1661 line 20) (Bearnson at R 1700) 
(TSL at R 2015 & R 1761 line 22). 
7. Mr. Teerlink represented himself to the Appellants 
and others as an owner of Commercial Union building. (Teerlink 
at R 1340) (Madsen at R 1170 line 4) (Bearnson at R 1706 line 9). 
Mr. Teerlink never disclosed that he would be getting real 
estate commissions, which he did receive in excess of $11,000.00. 
(R 1316, 1340). All the while, Mr. Teerlink held himself out as 
an expert thereby inducing the reliance and trust of Appellants. 
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(TSL at R 1673; JLC at R 1944). Notwithstanding the Findings of 
Fact indicating that Teerlink is the agent for Appellantsf 
(Finding #4 & Conclusion #24), testimony at trial and in the 
deposition of Blaine Savage indicated that Lee Teerlink was an 
owner and agent of Respondent (R 1530; Savage at R 153), Savage 
says Lee Teerlink was his mouthpiece (Savage at R 1531) and (TSL 
at R 1785 & R 1787) and that Teerlink himself implied that he was 
the agent for the Respondent and not the Appellants, Mr. 
Teerlink changed his testimony at trial denying he was the agent 
for Respondents to avoid his representations being construed as 
coming from the landlord to be relied upon. (Teerlink at R 1339, 
1340; Madsen at R 1170). [contrary to Finding #16]. 
8. At the doctors' request, Mr. Teerlink presented a 
written proposal to them on August 24, 1988, after checking with 
his expert in medical construction, Mr. Joel Madsen (Teerlink at 
R 1347; see also Exhibit 2 at R 1287). Mr. Teerlink produced an 
estimated bid of $97,840.00, and an estimated completion time of 
two months with occupancy to begin in November or December of the 
same year. (See Appellants' Exhibit 2). The letter was gone 
through with Teerlink and Appellants. (R 1667-1670). Mr. 
Teerlink, while under oath in his deposition denied making any 
written representations or bids (R 1341). Mr. Teerlink was then 
presented with the letter of August 24, 1988. (Exhibit 2). The 
12 
Exhibit clearly specified that the build out on the space would 
be $44.00 per square foot at $97,840.00 plus $5,000.00 
improvements needed on existing space referred to as U-care space 
that had already been constructed for the office facilities and 
it stated a variety of other benefits. (See Appellants' Exhibit 
2). The letter, Exhibit 2, and the representations were relied 
upon by Appellants as testified by Teerlink, Savage and the 
doctors. (Savage at R 1338-39; TSL at R 1672; JLC at R 1944; JNC 
at R 2031; DNC at R 2065). 
9. Appellants then hired Mr. Bearnson, an attorney, to 
negotiate the lease document in the first part of September, 
1988. (TSL at R 1680; Bearnson at R 1696; Teerlink at R 1291). 
Mr. Bearnson modified the Lease document so that occupancy could 
not begin until a final certificate of fitness for occupancy had 
been issued by the appropriate governmental authority. In 
addition, he required that the lessor expressly warrant that the 
use of the lease premises is a lawful and permitted use and would 
not be in violation of any law, ordinance, or regulation. The 
leased premises were to be used as a medical free-standing 
operating facility. Mr. Teerlink was aware from the outset that 
the facility needed to qualify for Medicaid/Medicare benefits. 
(Bearnson at R 1700, 1705, 1713). Accordingly, Mr. Teerlink knew 
in September, before the lease was signed by anyone, that an 
13 
important condition precedent on the face of the lease was for 
the facility to qualify for Medicare/Medicaid payments. 
(Teerlink at R 1322, 1323, 1335). Attorney Bearnson assured Dr. 
Lindley of this condition. (TSL at R 1682; Bearnson at R 1096, 
1702, 2017, 2019). [Note that this is all contrary to Finding 
#12 that Bearnson didn't discuss "I-certification" and Finding 
#24 & Conclusion #15 that Appellants didn't tell Respondent of 
this condition]. 
10. In early September, Appellants retained Mr. Bill 
Hall as a possible project architect. By September 17, 1988, Mr. 
Hall produced a proposed plan; however, at the recommendation of 
Mr. Joel Madsen, Mr. Hall was replaced four days later with 
architect William Nielson, an architect who claims to have done 
thirteen certified surgery centers. (TSL at R 1675). 
11.. On September 17, 1988, John L. Clayton signed an 
agreement as President of CPSS. Importantly, the project 
architect indicated, even as early as September 17, 1988, that he 
was aware that the entity involved as lessee was a corporation. 
(R 1947; Defendant's Exh. # 8 ) . 
12. On September 29, 1988 Dr. John L. Clayton, 
President of the corporation, was approached by Mr. Teerlink who 
told Dr. Clayton that he must immediately sign a lease as the 
lessee since another group, called Southeast Emergency, sought to 
14 
lease the space for more money. (JLC at R 1950; TSL at R 1686). 
Dr. Clayton signed the first lease as President of the 
corporation; he signed knowing that there were certain conditions 
on the face of the lease that had to be dealt with. (JLC at R 
1950-57; Teerlink at R 1294). Mr. John L. Clayton gave Mr. 
Teerlink a check for $2,628.00 for binding of this lease with its 
conditions on its face. 
13. Mr. Savage, representing the managers for the 
owners, rejected this first lease signed by CPSS, a corporation, 
because he didn't want a corporate lessee without guarantors. 
(Savage at R 1436, 1438). Mr. Johnson stipulates in trial that 
the lease was rejected. (Court at R 1331-32; Johnson at R 1331-
32). Amazingly, Conclusion of Law #12 states that this rejected 
(and whited-out) lease would be read together with a second lease 
subsequently signed by guarantors alone, but not by the principal 
lessee, to form one lease contract. 
14. On September 30, 1988, Mr. Teerlink indicated to 
the Appellants that Mr. Savage required personal guarantors on 
the lease. (Teerlink at R 1297; TSL at 1688-89). 
15. On October 3, 1988, Mr. Savage spoke with Dr. 
Lindley and attempted to persuade him to sign as a sole lessee. 
This is the only contact made with Mr. Savage and any of the 
Appellants before the second lease was actually signed. Dr. 
15 
Lindley told Mr. Savage that he would never become a lessee. (TSL 
at R 1778) and his minutes likewise reflected it (R-1432 line 12) 
[contrary to Finding #28]. 
16. On October 11, 1988, Mr. Savage sent a second 
draft lease with Mr. Teerlink to have all parties execute. 
(Teerlink at R 1298 line 13). In a meeting of October 11, 1988, 
John L. Clayton in behalf of the corporation refuses to sign 
until all conditions in the lease are met (JLC at R 1957 line 24, 
1958 line 1, 1959 line 4; DNC at R 2068 line 14; TSL at R 1256 
line 2, 1683 line 21) [all contrary to Finding #26 & Conclusion 
#3 & 4]. David Clayton and John N. Clayton later signed the 
second lease as guarantors with a three-year limitation and 
conditioned upon being satisfied that John L. Clayton will do his 
due diligence and become the lessee through his corporation on 
the second lease. (See above cites). 
17. October 18th Mr. Teerlink picked up the Lease at 
Clayton's office which is now signed in the guarantor boxes only 
by T. Scott Lindley, John N. Clayton and David Clayton. 
(Teerlink at R 1298). Mr. Teerlink had not witnessed the signing 
or discussed what the signing meant. (R 1298). This was the 
first time Teerlink ever had a lessee line left blank before. (R 
1365 line 14). The next day Mr. Savage unreasonably releases the 
existing lessees of the U-Care space unbeknownst to the 
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Appellants (TSL at R 1749 line 17; JLC at R 1965 line 8; JNC at R 
2055-56) [contrary to Finding #29 stating Respondent was told of 
the release]. The release allowed Mr. Teerlink to be paid his 
commissions. This release was executed one day after the second 
lease was signed by the guarantors notwithstanding Blaine 
Savage's (1) experience of four years in leasing (Savage at R 
1487), (2) his knowledge that a sub-lease could have been entered 
into keeping U-care as an obligor, (3) his understanding that the 
doctors signed as guarantors rather than lessees (R 1532, 1534, 
1559, 1560-63; Appellant's Exhibit 4) and that CPSA was the 
intended lessee. (Savage at R 1581, 1583, 1593). 
18. Mr. Savage testified he tore up the first lease (R 
1537) and that he was told that CPSS was a partnership of the 
three doctors (See first Complaint (R 2)). This story changed 
when the first lease was discovered to be between CPSS and JLC as 
president (whited-out) showing that CPSS was a corporation 
(Savage at R 1538-42). Then the second Amended Complaint alleged 
CPSA dba CPSS was to be the lessee. (See second Complaint) (R 
339). 
19. On October 24, 1988, Mr. Savage deposited the 
check he obtained from John L. Clayton's corporation on the first 
lease for $2,628.00. He did so even though he had rejected the 
corporation as the lessee. Mr. Savage attempted to use the 
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check—unbeknownst to the Appellants—to bind the second lease, 
(JLC at R 1953, 1956). 
20. The trial court found during trial that Doctors 
Lindley, John N. Clayton, and Dave Clayton signed on as 
guarantors and not as lessees of the second proposed lease. (R 
2054 line 3-6; R 2051 line 12; R 2053) [contrary to Finding #21]. 
In addition, Attorney Johnson so stipulated at trial. Finding 
#21, however, states that the doctors were to be bound as 
lessees. 
21. Mr. Teerlink had no discussions with Appellants or 
with Mr. Savage about the doctor's being lessees. (R 1378). 
22. Appellants testified that at that point they 
believed they had a month-to-month tenancy similar to the month-
to-month tenancy they then had at the Prowswood space wherein 
they continued to proceed ahead until they could determine that 
the conditions of the proposed lease were fulfilled. (JLC at R 
1934 line 5; 1943 line 27; 1959 line 4). 
23. In early November, 1988, the plans are completed 
by Mr. William Nielson and are delivered to the State for 
approval and to the contractors for bidding. 
24. On November 14, 1988, Mr. Madsen sent a letter to 
the doctors indicating that the State had approved the plan. See 
Exhibit 59. Mr. Madsen desired to begin demolishing the space 
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immediately even though bids were yet in since the facility for 
the surgical center had to be reconstructed and the existing 
offices had some remodeling to be done. (R 1185). Mr. Madsen 
provided a timeline for completion and indicated that the project 
would be delayed if demolishing could not start immediately (See 
Exhibit 59). Mr. Madsen proceeded on November 23, with 
demolition of 2700 square feet of the space based on Mr. Lindley 
suggesting he could go ahead before the bids were in. (Madsen at 
R 1152). Appellants could not move into the existing U-care 
space since operating rooms were unavailable. (TSL at R 2024 
lines 6 & 24). 
25. On December 30, 1988, the bids returned much 
higher than anyone had expected. (JLC at R 1962 line 15; Madsen 
at R 1179 line 7). The bids went from the represented $97,000.00 
to $320,000.00. (Madsen at R 1179 line 25, 1180 line 6). This 
is contrary to Finding #39 which suggests that the final bid was 
$39.98 per square foot, the final bid was for $99.00 per square 
foot despite Mr. Teerlink's assertion that the build-out would be 
for $44.00 per square foot. (Madsen R 1417 line 20). 
26. Mr. Madsen agreed to limit his fees and work the 
bids to get a cost more in line with the original estimates. 
However, by the December 30 bid time limits, the first lease 
payment was due as per the face of the lease (See Exhibit 11). 
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That rental payment was made by the Appellants in anticipation of 
going forward to make the premises work but was paid as a month-
to-month tenancy. (JLC at R 1982 line 22). 
27. Appellants made loan applications for $300,000 to 
Valley Bank in anticipation of moving into the space when all of 
the conditions were met. This loan was for the leasehold 
improvements and equipment and furnishings. (Hurst at R 1193 
line 7; 1209 line 7) [contrary to Findings #43, 44, 51 that the 
loan was only for improvements]. 
28. In January, February, and March, 1989 the Claytons 
continued to work toward getting the certifications from the 
State and to control the costs. The costs got worse and the 
State was still demanding substantial changes in the plans as 
late as April of 1989, to-wit: there was no State approval. 
(See Exhibit 52). John L. Clayton began to believe the space was 
not capable of receiving an I-certification. (JNC at R 2039 line 
11). John N. Clayton had some ministerial, yet easy tasks such 
as application and a written narrative to complete for CPSS (JLC 
at R 2037). In March, 1989, Dr. Lindley returned from the 
Philippines to find that costs had escalated even further. It 
appeared to Dr. Lindley that certification could not be obtained, 
even at great additional expense. In order to save his practice, 
Dr. Lindley moved to a new office space at Alta View Hospital and 
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therein signed a new Lease in belief that the existing lease 
space was a month-to-month tenancy. (TSL at R 1741-46). 
29. In April, 1989, Mr. Savage and Mr. Teerlink met 
with Dr. Lindley and demanded that he sign an acknowledgement he 
was a Lessee and pay money or face a multi-million dollar 
lawsuit. (TSL at R 1744 line 7; Savage at 1573 line 6). 
30. On April 26, 1989, the doctors consulted with Mr. 
Zoll and sent a letter of termination for the month-to-month 
tenancy to Mr. Savage. 
31. On May 8, 1989, Appellants were served with a 
lawsuit demanding over 2 million dollars in alleged losses 
including punitive damage claims which punitive damages were 
dismissed by the court at trial. (See first Complaint of 
Plaintiff) (R 2). 
32. Respondents asked for damages of (1) lost rents 
plus $57,000.00 to rebuild space at $21.00 per foot 
notwithstanding their testimony that to rebuild would be $13.00 
per foot; (2) $15,000.00 in commissions paid to Blaine Savage for 
re-leasing the same space to Holy Cross in mitigation of rents 
that were never agreed to, penalties and attorney fees. 
33. Since Appellants were unable to move to their 
surgery space that they had anticipated, they lost income from 
the surgery center, thousands of dollars in payments for 
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architectural fees that they spent and the expenses of Dr. 
Lindley to start up a new location and their legal fees. See 
damages as testified by Art Dummer. (R 2118 line 18; Summary 
Exhibit #14 of Appellants). 
34. An expert witness, Mr. Fred Green, an architect of 
eighteen years, testified that he reviewed all pertinent 
documents and the building codes. He opined that, due to 
existing building codes, only at very substantial cost could I-
certification be attained for the CUA building since it is a 3-N 
building; he said that it is like putting a "square peg in a 
round hole." (R 2067-2091) [contrary to Finding #53, 54 & 
Conclusion #14]. Moreover, Mr. Green testified that 3-N was not 
even permitted to receive I-certification. (R 2080 line 15). 
35. Mr. Erikson, manager of inspection services for 
Salt Lake County, testified that he reviewed the permits filed by 
CUA. A new occupancy permit was required upon demolition but 
none was applied for; therefore, the proposed lease could not 
legally commence. (R 2104-08; Savage at R 1507). 
36. Another tenant, Holy Cross Hospital, signed a 
lease as a corporation—but without guarantors—and moved into 
the premises. (Savage at R 1499 line 5). 
37. Savage paid himself a commission of $15,000.00 
which he charged to Appellants. (Savage at R 1492 line 23). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DOES THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS VOID THE ALLEGED LEASE SINCE IT 
WAS SIGNED ONLY BY GUARANTORS AND NOT BY THE CORPORATE 
LESSEE? 
The Respondent has relied upon a written lease document to 
establish its case. However, as the Court is aware, and as the 
Respondent has admitted, this lease has not been subscribed by 
any officer of Clayton Plastic Surgery Associates nor has anyone 
signed in the section set aside for the lessee. It only has the 
names of the three guarantors on the guarantor signature lines of 
the lease. The lease is on its face over a period of five years, 
and it is within the purview of Utah Code Annotated, Sections 25-
5-3 and 25-5-4 (as amended 1958). Utah Code Annotated, Section 
25-5-3 states: 
Every contract for the leasing of land for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of the any 
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless 
the contract or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or 
sale is to be made, or by his authorized agent 
thereunto authorized in writing. (emphasis added) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 25-5-4 states in pertinent part: 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, 
or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in 
writing signed by the party to be charged with the 
agreement. 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not 
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to be performed within one year from the 
making of the agreement. 
The second quoted provision of the statute was restated in 
the case of Zeese v. Estate of Siegel: 
A lease agreement for a term longer than a period of 
one year creates an interest in real property, but, in 
addition, is a contract. The obligations of a lessee 
are contractual in the applicable provisions under the 
Statute of Frauds as set forth in Section 25-5-4(1) 
U.C.A.1953, namely, that every agreement by its terms 
if not to be performed within one year of the making 
thereof shall be void unless such agreement is in 
writing subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith. 
534 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah 1975) (emphasis added). 
The term of the lease is over one year and is for the 
leasing of land. Therefore, the lease is within the purview of 
the Statute of Frauds. However, Respondent obtained judgment 
against the Appellants CPSA, T. Scott Lindley, John N. Clayton 
and David Clayton jointly and severally as lessees even though 
the lease was not signed by a Lessee. 
The document relied upon by the Respondent is signed only by 
Dr. Lindley, Dr. John N. Clayton, Dr. David N. Clayton as 
guarantors. on the signature lines entitled "guarantors." 
Furthermore, testimony throughout the trial indicated that the 
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doctors were signing these lines conditionally as guarantors for 
the proposed corporate lessee CPSA. The doctors never indicated 
that they were the lessees or that they were a partnership. The 
Respondents, through Mr. Teerlink, never discussed with 
Appellants what the signing meant at the guarantor lines. 
Likewise, Mr. Teerlink never knew who the Lessee was. (R 1378 
line 14 and R 1365 line 25). The conditional signatures of the 
three doctors as guarantors cannot satisfy the signature 
necessary to take the proposed lease out of the Statute of 
Frauds. 
There was a previous lease document signed by Dr. John L. 
Clayton as President of CPSS—but without any guarantors. 
However, that lease was admittedly rejected by Respondent. Since 
the first lease—signed by the corporation—was rejected, it 
cannot become a part of the second lease—signed only by the 
guarantors—in order to produce a single, unified document. The 
first lease constituted an offer to enter into a lease with 
Respondent. It was rejected. "[W]hen an offer is rejected by 
refusal, conditional acceptance or by counter-offer, the party 
making the original offer is relieved from liability and the 
party who rejected the offer cannot, of his own volition, create 
an agreement by his subsequent acceptance." Burton v. Coombs, 
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557 P.2d 148, 149 (Utah 1976). That, however, is precisely what 
the lower court has done. The rejected lease, signed by the 
corporation, was combined with the proposed lease, signed by 
guarantors, to magically coalesce into one lease which will 
satisfy the statute of frauds. That simply cannot be done. 
Furthermore, the evidence clearly indicates that was not 
intended: early in the trial, Mr. Steve Johnson stipulated that 
the leases were not to be read together. (R 1331). 
The requirement under the statute that the party to be 
charged have signed a writing or memorandum has not been 
satisfied in this case. Consequently, the proposed lease 
contract is void. The Respondent cannot state any cause of 
action based upon any such a document other than the leasehold 
being a month-to-month tenancy. 
II. IS THE PROPOSED LEASE INVALID SINCE EXPRESS CONDITIONS 
PRECEDENT HAVE NOT YET BEEN FULFILLED? 
Conditions precedent on the face of the proposed lease 
contract were not met. Those include: 
(a) obtaining I-certification for the premises. 
(b) commencement of the lease as per Section 2 of the 
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lease. 
Section 2 of the proposed lease provides: 
The term of this lease shall be for a period of 
five (5) years, commencing on the first day of the 
month succeeding the occupancy date . . . . 
The words "occupancy" date shall be deemed to 
refer to the date fifteen (15) days after [1] a 
temporary or final certificate of fitness for occupancy 
has been issued by the appropriate governmental 
authorities having jurisdiction of the Lease Property, 
or [2] as soon as lessee commences to do business in, 
upon or from the Leased Property, whichever is first. 
The State's qualified expert, Carl R. Erikson, testified 
that no certificate of occupancy was given as required for the 
doctors' practice—not only by the lease but also by law. 
Further, all who testified agreed that Appellants have never 
commenced doing business in the leased premises. The conditions 
precedent established by Section 2 clearly have not been met. 
This document was prepared and provided by the Respondent. 
If there is any ambiguity in the provisions of Section 2 of the 
alleged lease, that ambiguity must be construed against 
Respondent, the drafter. "It is [] settled law that a contract 
will be construed against its drafter." Parks Enter, v. New 
Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1982). 
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If indeed there is any ambiguity in the requirement (1) that 
a temporary or final certificate of fitness for occupancy has 
been issued by the appropriate governmental authorities, or (2) 
that the lessee commences to do business in, upon or from the 
Leased Property, such ambiguity should be construed against 
Respondent. Clearly, then, this condition precedent to the 
commencement of the lease has not been met. 
The consistent testimony of Appellants, Mr. Brad Bearnson, 
Mr. Bill Hall, and Mr. Lee Teerlink indicated that the doctors 
expected to lease space which would qualify for reimbursement 
from Medicare and Medicaid. Under the appropriate State and 
Federal regulations, that required an I-certificate (not I-
occupancy), as stated in Section 6 of the Lease where Lessor 
warranted such a condition. It is clear that such an I-
certification was never obtained and licensure under State and 
Federal regulations was never obtained to allow for Appellants to 
obtain reimbursement under Medicare an Medicaid. Unquestionably, 
this condition was not met. [contrary to Conclusion #15]. 
Legal Basis for the Failure of the Proposed Lease Due to Failure 
of Conditions Precedent 
It is settled law that if the consent or actions of an 
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independent third person is a condition precedent to a contract, 
the contract is not enforceable until the act is accomplished. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Welch Transfer and Storage, Inc. 
v. Oldham; 
Where fulfillment of a contract is made to depend upon 
the act or consent of a third person over whom neither 
party has any control, the contract cannot be enforced 
unless the act is performed or the consent given. 
663 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah 1983) 
Obtaining "a temporary or final certificate of fitness for 
occupancy has been issued by the appropriate governmental 
authorities" was an express condition precedent for the lease. 
The certificate had to come from an independent third party. 
Therefore, without the certification from Salt Lake County and 
the State Department of Health, the proposed lease never came 
into being. Id. 
The express conditions precedent to the lease cannot simply 
be ignored. 
Generally speaking neither of the parties, nor the 
court has any right to ignore or modify conditions 
which are clearly expressed merely because it may 
subject one of the parties to hardship, but they must 
be enforced "in accordance with the intentions as ** 
manifested by the language used by the parties to the 
contract." 
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Jones v. Acme Building Products, Inc., 452 P.2d 743, 746 (Utah 
1969) (quoting Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2.d 163, 321 
P.2d 221 (1958)). When, as in this case, "the language of the 
contract is such that the intentions of the parties are clearly 
and unequivocally expressed, it must be enforced according to its 
terms." Winqets, Inc. v. Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Utah 
1972). The contract "should be enforced according to the meaning 
of its terms as intended by the parties insofar as that can be 
ascertained." Holley v. Federal-American Partners, 507 P.2d 381, 
383 (Utah 1973) (emphasis added). Appellants clearly intended to 
have a facility which would meet the requirements of certificate 
for occupancy and I-certification for Medicaid/Medicare. 
Determining whether these requirements were conditions is 
found with the intent of the parties. 
Whether a promise is conditional depends upon the 
parties' intent, which is derived from a fair and 
reasonable construction of the language used in light 
of all the circumstances when the parties executed the 
contract. 
Porter v. Groover, 734 P.2d 464, 465 (1987) (citing Career v. 
Thurman, 581 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978). The language of the 
proposed lease and the circumstances surrounding the lease 
negotiations indicate that the doctors clearly intended to 
protect themselves and to establish some conditions precedent to 
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their being bound by a five-year lease contract. Testimony in 
the lower court clearly evidenced that Appellants expected that 
the space be certifiable under Medicare/Medicaid and that it 
would get an I-certificate. This is clearly shown by Section 6 
of the proposed lease agreement where Respondent or Lessor 
warranted such a certification. 
Three other material conditions precedent were also not 
satisfied. First, the signature by CPSS was a condition 
precedent to binding the guarantors to the lease document. 
Certainly those guarantors never would have signed unless CPSS 
was the lessee. CPSS never signed because it never intended to 
be bound by the document until the conditions had been met. 
Second, Teerlink informed the doctors that they would be 
able to enter their new office space shortly after Thanksgiving 
in 1988. See Appellants' Exhibit 2. However, the doctors had 
still not been able to move in by the following April when the 
whole situation began to disintegrate. Certainly, this had a 
deleterious effect on Appellants' medical practices. Appellants, 
therefore, should not be bound by the lease. They were 
bargaining for office space which could be used shortly after 
Thanksgiving. That was a condition which was known throughout 
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the lease negotiations. The office space was, however, 
unavailable. Therefore, this condition precedent was not met. 
Third, and finally, Teerlink informed Appellants that the 
cost to renovate the CUA office space—so that it would be 
suitable for their practice—would be $44.00 per square foot. 
See Appellants' Exhibit 2. The bids, however, came in initially 
at $112.00 per square foot (later reduced to $99.00 per square 
foot). Appellants entered into the lease negotiations with the 
understanding that they would pay only $44.00 per square foot for 
the renovation. They couldn't possibly afford to renovate at 
$99.00 per square foot; therefore, this too was a condition 
precedent to the proposed lease. As was stated in Kinsman v. 
Kinsman, "failure of a material condition relieves the other 
party of any obligation to perform." 748 P.2d 210, 213 (Utah App. 
1988). 
Any obligations to perform under this lease are not in 
effect since there were material failures of explicit and 
implicit conditions precedent to this lease. Accordingly, any 
damages based upon this proposed lease are not recoverable. 
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III. IS THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE AVAILABLE TO COMMERCIAL 
UNION ASSOCIATES? 
Respondents relied upon the doctrine of part performance to 
(1) bring the alleged lease contract into being and then to (2) 
sue for money damages on the contract. These two remedies cannot 
be simultaneously pursued. The Utah Supreme Court held in Baugh 
v. Parley, that part performance is not available to take oral 
contracts out of the statute of frauds. 112 Utah 1, 185 P.2d 335 
(1947). The equitable doctrine of part performance operates only 
in favor of the purchaser or lessee, not in favor of the seller 
or lessor. 
Baugh v. Parley involved an attempt to use the doctrine of 
part performance to take a contract out of the statute of frauds. 
At issue was the operation of Section 33-5-3 Utah Code Annotated 
(1943)r the predecessor to the statute of frauds relied upon by 
the Appellants in this case. The case in relevant part stated: 
Plaintiff relies on the doctrine of part performance to 
take the contract out of the statute of frauds. He 
urges that his efforts to resell the property to 
Perkins, together with his down payment of $500 to 
defendant, amounted to sufficient part performance to 
take the contract out of the statute of frauds. In 2 
Williston on Contracts, Sec. 494, page 1430, it said: 
"From an early date, courts of equity have accepted 
from the operation of the Statute of Frauds contracts 
for the sale of land whether it has been part 
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performance, so called of the contract." 
The basis of the doctrine originally was that equity 
would not permit the statute to be used as an 
instrument for the perpetration of a fraud. The 
doctrine is now firmly established in the rules of 
equity jurisprudence of both England and most of our 
states. It is equally well established that the 
doctrine is purely equitable in nature, and has no 
place in an action at law. The doctrine is not 
available to a Plaintiff who brings an action at law 
for money damages on an oral agreement to purchase 
land. See, 1 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence Sec. 103; 
2 Williston op. cit. Sec. 494, P. 1440. The cases 
holding to this rule are collected and discussed in an 
annotation in 59 A.L.R. 1305. 
Since the second count of the complaint is based on a 
breach of the oral agreement to sell the land and is an 
action at law for money damages, the doctrine of part 
performance is not available to plaintiff, and it is 
unnecessary for us to consider whether the acts alleged 
by the plaintiff as part performance would be 
sufficient to take the contract out of the statute in 
an equity suit for specific performance. It is clear 
that the second count of the complaint did not state a 
cause of action. 
185 P.2d 335, 337-38 (Utah 1947). 
That the doctrine of part performance is not available in an 
action at for money damages for the breach of an oral promise to 
convey land is well settled. See e.g., McDonald v. Barton Bros. 
Investment Co., 631 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1981); McKinnon v. Corp. 
of the Pres. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
529 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1974); Baugh v. Logan City, 495 P.2d 814, 
817 (Utah 1972); Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570, 580 (Utah 
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1953). Furthermore, a lease is commonly viewed as a conveyance 
of land. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 900 n.2 
(Utah 1989) ("a lease agreement is both a conveyance of land and 
a contract"); Penelko, Inc. v. John Price Assoc., 642 P.2d 1229, 
1236 (Utah 1982) ("A lease has a dual character—it presents the 
aspect of a contract and also that of a conveyance.") (quoting 
POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS 531 (3d Am. Ed.)). 
Hence, Respondent cannot use the doctrine of part 
performance to claim any money damages in this case. 
Accordingly, as a matter of law, the Respondent's cause of action 
for breach must be dismissed. Furthermore, it is clear that 
whether the equitable relief is characterized as promissory 
estoppel, equitable estoppel, part performance, or ratification, 
they are all equitable in nature and as the cases clearly state 
they are not available in action for money damages. Reliance 
upon those doctrines in a case within the statute of frauds is 
not sustainable. 
IV. CAN THE GUARANTORS UNDER THE PROPOSED LEASE AGREEMENT BE 
BOUND AS PRINCIPALS? 
Appellant, doctors, signed the proposed lease agreement in 
signature lines labeled "guarantor." The legal term "guarantor" 
is used to denominate someone who is secondarily liable. BLACK'S 
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LAW DICTIONARY 634 (5th ed. 1979, West Publishing Co.). A 
"guarantor is only secondarily liable for the obligation he has 
guaranteed . . . ." Mooney v. GR and Assoc.,, 746 P.2d 1174, 1176 
n.2 (Utah App. 1987). Moreover, "the [guarantor] is not liable 
to the creditor unless his principal is liable . . . ." 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS Sec. 1214. Therefore, since there is no 
principal who is liable on the proposed lease, the doctors, as 
guarantors, are likewise not liable on the lease. In fact, both 
Mr. Savage and Mr. Teerlink indicated that the doctors would be 
secondarily liable and that they never discussed with the doctors 
any arrangement to the contrary. 
An examination of the proposed Restatement of the Law of 
Suretyship reinforces the conclusion that the doctors are not 
liable under the asserted lease. 
[A] "guarantor typically contracts to fulfill an 
obligation upon the default of the principal obligor. 
REST. OF SURETYSHIP Sec. 1 (Tentative Draft dated No. 1 dated 
March 23, 1992). In this case, the doctors expected to fulfill 
the obligation of a principal lessee. This indicates that the 
arrangement was a guaranty or suretyship. (Note that these terms 
are used interchangeably; E.g.: "'Surety' includes guarantor." 
Sec. 70A-1-201 U.C.A. (1953)). The Restatement continues: 
Courts have used a number of different formulations to 
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define situations giving rise to suretyship status. 
Perhaps the most common formulation is that 
"[s]uretyship may be defined as a contractual relation 
whereby one person engages to be answerable for the 
debt or default another." 
Id. Sec. 1 Reporter's note, comment b (quoting Madison County 
Farmers Ass'n v. American Employers Ins. Co., 209 F.2d 581, 585 
(8th Cir. 1954)). The doctors intended to answer for the debt of 
a principal lessee and to be secondarily liable on the 
obligation. 
[I]f the parties to a contract identify one party as a 
"guarantor" or the contract as a "guaranty," the party 
so identified is a secondary obligor and the secondary 
obligation is to perform the underlying obligation, or 
pay damages for its breach, upon default of the 
principal obligor on the underlying obligation. 
Id. sec. 12. Since the doctors signed as "guarantor," they are 
secondarily liable, if at all. Their liability is secondary to 
that of the principal. However, the principal did not sign the 
lease contract and is not bound thereby. Horman v. Gordon, 740 
P.2d 1346, 1351 (Utah App. 1987). It follows, therefore, that 
the doctors are likewise not bound since their obligation is 
conditioned upon some principal's being bound to the lease. This 
rule is uniform throughout our sister states. See, e.g., Alzado 
v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc, 752 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1988) 
(guaranty agreement is not enforceable if underlying obligation 
on which it is based is void); Bloom v. Bender, 313 P.2d 568 
(Cal. 1957). 
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The Restatement of Suretyship provides further: 
The standards that apply to interpretation of contracts 
in general apply to interpretation of contracts 
creating secondary obligations. 
REST. OF SURETYSHIP sec. 11 (tentative draft, March 23, 1992) 
(emphasis added). It is a general rule of interpretation of 
contracts that wording, if ambiguous, is construed against the 
drafter. Parks Enter., Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 
P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1982). In this case, Respondent was the 
drafter. Therefore, any doubts as to the meaning the terms 
"guarantor" must decided in favor of Appellants and against 
Respondent. The result is that the doctors are merely 
guarantors. This is buttressed by testimony by Mr. Savage and 
Mr. Teerlink that they never discussed with the doctors their 
being primarily liable, they merely saw the lease as signed and 
made their own assumptions. (Teerlink at R 1378 line 14). 
The doctors were merely guarantors for a principal obligor. 
There was no principal obligor on the proposed lease and the 
Respondents have not proven to the contrary by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Therefore, the doctors should not be liable for 
the lease obligations. 
V. SHOULD THE PROPOSED LEASE FAIL DUE TO MANIFEST LACK OF 
MUTUAL ASSENT? 
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The Appellant Clayton Plastic Surgery Associates has never 
expressed its assent in any form to the lease presented by the 
Respondent. Importantly, Respondent has not presented any 
evidence that Clayton Plastic Surgery Associates accepted the 
proposed lease. This is an essential basis for any contract and 
must be shown by the parties seeking enforcement of a contract— 
the Respondent. 
"The burden of proving the existence of a contract is on the 
party seeking enforcement of it." Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 
1384, 1386 (Utah 1977): See also B&R Supply Company v. 
Brinahurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (Utah 1972). 
Respondent was required to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the corporate Appellant Clayton Plastic Surgery 
Associates accepted the terms of the (second) lease presented by 
Respondent. 
However, if Respondent was attempting to prove the terms of 
the contract through estoppel, it had to show this through clear 
and convincing evidence. The testimony was consistent throughout 
the trial that John L. Clayton, nor any other officer of the 
corporation, executed or manifested any assent to the contract 
being relied upon by the Respondent. Indeed there was no 
testimony from either the Respondent or the Appellants indicating 
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any form of assent or agreement to these terms of the contract. 
Of course, the signature by the doctors as guarantors cannot be 
viewed as a manifestation of assent by the corporation. The sum 
of the testimony indicates that there was no mutual manifestation 
of assent by the parties. As the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
"[I]t is a basic principal of contract law that there can be no 
contract without the mutual consent of the parties." John Call 
Engineering v. Manti Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987). The 
corporation never manifested its assent to be bound by the lease 
contract nor did the three conditional guarantors. Therefore, it 
cannot be bound by; nor can the guarantors be bound due to the 
lack of a principal lessee. 
VI. SHOULD THE PROPOSED LEASE FAIL FOR LACK OF MEETING OF THE 
MINDS? 
It was clear after six days of trial that there was no 
meeting of the minds as to certain material terms of this Lease. 
The parties couldn't even agree upon who was to be the Lessee. 
Mr. Savage couldn't decide who the lessees were. He thought the 
corporation was the lessee. (R 1583) and he did not know if 
Lessee was a corporation or a partnership (R 1541 line 13). 
Another time, he thought the doctors were the lessees (R 1555-56) 
and (R 1542 line 20) and further, that Section 6 was supposed to 
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be Lessee not Lessor (R 1525 line 19). Teerlink testified at one 
point that the doctors were the lessees (R 1376-77), but later 
admitted that he wasn't sure who the lessee(s) was. (R 1365 line 
25) and (R 1367). 
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any 
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the 
parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or 
implied, with sufficient definition to be enforced. 
Pinaree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 
(Utah 1976). In this case, there was no agreement as to material 
terms of the contract including: (1) the identity of the 
principal lessee, (2) the principal obligor, (3) required form of 
assent to be expressed by the parties, (4) what would happen if 
the bids came back two to three times higher than represented, 
(5) whether failure of conditions precedent would create a month-
to-month tenancy. That the identity of the parties is material 
was determined in Nixon and Nixon v. John New and Associates, 641 
P.2d 144 (Utah 1982). Likewise, the inability of the parties to 
this suit to agree on who are the parties to the proposed lease 
demonstrates a patent lack of meeting of the minds. Therefore, 
the lease contract never actually came into being. 
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VII. SHOULD THE PROPOSED LEASE FAIL DUE TO IMPOSSIBILITY OF 
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT? 
The doctrine of impossibility has been defined as follows: 
Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an 
obligation is deemed discharged if an unforeseen event 
occurs after formation of a contract without fault of 
the obligated party, which events make performance of 
the obligation impossible are highly impracticable. 
Western Properties v. Southern Utah Aviation, 776 P.2d 656f 658 
(Utah App. 1989) (notes omitted). The rationale for this rule is 
founded on principals of assent and basic equity. The goal is to 
protect the expectations of the parties while seeking to do 
justice. 
A party may be relieved from performing an obligation 
under a contract where supervening events, 
unforeseeable at the time the contract was made, render 
performance of the contract impossible. 
Holmgren v. Utah/Idaho Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1978) 
stated. Impossibility means not only strict impossibility, but 
also impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable 
difficulty, expense, and loss involved. See Jones v. Servel, 
Inc., 186 N.E. 2d 689 (Ind. App. 1962). Also defined as follows: 
It is now recognized that "'A thing is impossible in legal 
contemplation when it is not practicable: and a thing is 
impracticable when it can only be done at excessive and 
unreasonable cost.'" 
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Transatlantic Fin, Corp, v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (quoting Mineral Park Land Co., 156 P. 458, 460 
(Cal 1916). 
In this case, there was both literal impossibility and 
impracticability, I-certification was not attainable without 
expenditure of double the amount of funds beyond that which was 
economically feasible and represented. In addition, Section 6 of 
the proposed lease provides that the lessor expressly warranted 
that the uses proposed would not be in violation of any law, 
ordinance or regulation. The use was for free standing surgical 
operating facilities for Medicaid/Medicare reimbursement. It is 
clear that any risk that arose because of difficulties in getting 
it certified under I-certification were expressly assumed by the 
Respondent Commercial Union Associates in this case. 
Consequently, when it appeared that there is impossibility under 
these circumstances, the risk should fall upon the Respondent in 
this case, rather than the Appellants. 
VIII. DID THE PROPOSED LEASE FAIL DUE TO FRUSTRATION OF 
PURPOSE? 
Frustration of purpose excuses a promisor when the 
objectives of a contract have been utterly defeated by 
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circumstances arising after the formation of the agreement. 
Performance is excused under this rule even though there is no 
impediment to actual performance. The Restatement of Contracts 
provides: 
Section 288. Frustration of the Object or Effect of 
the Contract. 
Where the assumed possibility of a desired object 
or effect to be attained by either party to a contract 
forms the basis on which both parties enter into, and 
this object or effect is or surely will be frustrated, 
a promisor who is without fault in causing the 
frustration, and who is harmed thereby, is discharged 
from the duty of performing his promise unless a 
contrary intention appears. 
Section 456. Existing Impossibility. 
. . . A promise imposes no duty of performance if the 
promise is made impossible because of facts existing 
when the promise is made, of which the promisor neither 
knows nor has reason to know. 
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS sec. 288 & 456 (quoted in Ouaaliana 
v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301, 305 (Utah 1975)). 
Neither party initially realized that the office space was not 
appropriate to build a free-standing ambulatory clinic 
certifiable under Medicare/Medicaid but the Lessor should have 
known. The testimony of the architect Fred Green indicated that 
both the configuration of the three different spaces, and other 
factors caused this to be a very improper space to establish an 
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I-certification. Respondent, through its agent, Leland Teerlink, 
indicated that this would be an ideal space to put such a 
surgical center and that they had previously had such space in 
their facilities. 
Based upon all the testimony of Fred Green, as well as the 
clear indications of high cost overruns that were basically 
caused by attempting to squeeze an I-certification into such a 
small and inappropriate space, this is the perfect example of a 
case of frustration of purpose. Accordingly, any further 
performance by the Appellants under this contract should be 
excused. 
IX. SHOULD PAROL EVIDENCE HAVE BEEN PERMITTED IN ORDER TO AID IN 
DETERMINING THE MEANING OF THE TERMS OF THE LEASE? 
"[0]ral testimony may not be admitted to vary or contradict 
the terms of a document, however, it is admissible to clarify the 
meaning of ambiguous provisions." Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners 
Assoc., 656 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 1982). The trial court made 
conflicting rulings regarding the admissibility of parol evidence 
to interpret the putative lease agreement. That court allowed 
parol evidence in at trial reflecting that the lease had 
ambiguities in Section 2 and Section 6 as to the identity of the 
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Lessor and Lessee. (R 133- line 16). The court allowed 
Respondent's case to be laden with parol evidence from the outset 
of the trial by, for instance, reading both leases together as 
one. (R 1331). Notwithstanding, the court later turned 180 
degrees and ruled that the lease was an integrated unambiguous 
document with both leases to be read together even though Mr. 
Steven Johnson stipulated that reading the leases together was 
not his legal theory. (R 1331 line 6; see Conclusion #12). 
Mr. Johnson admitted that lease number 1 was rejected 
because there were no guarantors. (R 1331). In fact, Mr. 
Johnson stipulated that the lease was only introduced to show the 
chronology (R 1331 & Exhibit 4). Mr. Johnson stipulated that the 
second lease was to be proved by ratification or estoppel (R 
1331) and not through combining the two leases into one (R 1331, 
1332). Mr. Johnson admitted that Respondents do not claim to 
take John L. Clayton's signature off one lease and put him on 
another, contrary to Conclusion #12. 
The Court also sustained objections of Respondent to prevent 
cross-examination of Appellant into parol evidence and the Court 
said it was relying only on the four corners of the lease (R 1516 
line 17). That Court should have decided definitively that the 
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lease was either ambiguous or unambiguous. If unambiguous, all 
the evidence relating to who the lessee is, the prior lease being 
read with the second lease, the evidence of CPSS being a 
partnership, etc., cannot be used to show there is a lease. For 
instance, the trial court ordered a finding in trial that the 
parties signed as guarantors. (R 2051-54). Steve Johnson stated 
the corporation was the lessee and the doctors were guarantors. 
(R 2052-53). Strangely, the Findings assert that the guarantors 
were lessees along with CPSA—contrary to the evidence and 
stipulation of the Court, counsel, and the evidence. 
Appellants have been denied the justice to which they are 
entitled. The trial court initially ruled that parol evidence 
was admissible; therefore, testimony concerning the determination 
of principal lessee, whether the doctors were indeed to be 
guarantors or obligors, etc., should have been fully admitted and 
considered. The trial court then decided that parol evidence was 
not admissible; therefore, the title "guarantor" where the 
doctors signed, the express conditions precedent, etc., should be 
given the interpretations commonly giving the terms used. In 
either case, this Court must reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and find for Appellants. At the very least, Appellants 
should be granted a new trial in order to sort out the manifold 
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incongruities found in the Findings of Fact, the Conclusions of 
Law, and the record. 
X. IN THE EVENT THIS COURT DECIDES IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT, THIS 
COURT SHOULD CONSIDER DAMAGES SUFFERED BY THE APPELLANTS. 
(a) Damages suffered by the Appellants due to the 
Respondent's breach of their express warranty and their 
negligence are as follows: 
1. Out-of-pocket losses for architectural fees of 
$23,000.00, plus attorney fees. 
2. Demolition fees amounting to $6,000.00; 
3. On-going payments of alleged rents amounts to 
$34,000.00; 
4. Loss relating to the non-development of the facilities 
where the Clayton Plastic Surgery Center amounting to 
$107,623.00; 
5. Loss of $66,000.00 to Clayton Plastic Surgery 
Associates for the failure of the Lindley buy-out 
to take place. 
XI. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT PROVIDING FACTS UNDISPUTED AT TRIAL 
INTO THE FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT TO BE APPLIED TO THE LAW 
By reviewing the records, it is easily determined that 
facts are omitted from the Findings and should be considered for 
application of facts to law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants have established numerous and overlapping 
defenses to the complaints filed by the Respondent. It seems an 
obvious consequence of such a flawed transaction that there would 
certainly be numerous theories to defend against. The Court 
should be able to cut through everything by selecting the option 
which both parties agree on; that the statute of frauds has been 
violated and that conditions precedent were not met. Even if the 
Court looks for other means of resolving this dispute, the 
appropriate remedy should be rescission or unenforceability. At 
the very least, Appellants should be granted a new trial in order 
to sort out the myriad of conflicting conclusions and rulings 
propounded in this case. The Respondent should not be given such 
a windfall at Appellants tremendous expenses when it failed to 
make sure all the "i's" were dotted and "t's" were crossed which 
is the experienced responsibility of Respondent to make sure the 
minds met on the lease. 
DATED this / day of ^ V^^n 1992. 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
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